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THE ROLE OF THE CONCEPT OF
RESPONSIBILITY IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
PROCEEDINGS

FRANCIS BARRY McCARTHY*

To what side soever we turn our eyes, we are presented
with a confused scene of contradictions, uncertainty,
hardships, and arbitrary power. In the present age, we
seem universally aiming at perfection; let us not therefore neglect to perfect the laws on which our lives and
fortunes depend.
Voltaire
The juvenile justice system is caught in a crosscurrent of conflicting philosophies. Contemporary thought perceives the juvenile
court simultaneously as an instrument of social control designed to
deal with the criminal activities of children and as a therapeutic
institution providing assistance, guidance and treatment to children
in need. While these objectives would not necessarily seem to be
mutually exclusive, in both practice and theory the juvenile court
has frequently been torn between the traditional theories and purposes of the criminal law, and those provided by a medical model
which see~ criminal or delinquent behavior as the product of a
sickness or disease. This dilemma is more apparent in the juvenile
court than in any other social institution.
The juvenile court found its principal formative impetus in a
growing dissatisfaction with the criminal process. 1 Reformers devised an alternative system which called extensively upon the
behavioral and social sciences to diagnose the causes of crimes
committed by children and tu fashion means through which these
causes could be eliminated at the outset, or through which the
effects or symptoms could be treated and cured. In this respect,
legal institutions almost completely relegated responsibility for the
operation of the juvenile court to the behavioral sciences. While
the "symptom" which was the basis for the official intervention by

• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. A.B., 1%7, Stonehill College;
J.D., 1971, Boston College; LL.M., 1975, Columbia University.
1
See note 29 and accompanying text infra.
0
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the juvenile court generally remained defined in terms of criminal
acts, 2 the content and significance of these acts were determined
almost exclusively by behavioral science standards. Consequently,
juvenile courts abandoned many fundamental principles of the
criminal law.
Many students of juvenile law consider the juvenile court's departure from the principles of the criminal law to be the mark of
enlightenment since the criminal law is thought to be based on
anachronistic concepts. It is suggested here, however, that a substantial amount of the wisdom of the criminal law which was
incorporated through centuries of development, along with the
valuable interests that it protected, has been too cavalierly dismissed.
The exclusive focus of this article is upon proceedings in which
delinquency is· determined, even though the juvenile court generally possesses a broad jurisdiction which covers a variety of matters other than delinquency. There is, however, a fundamental
difference between delinquency proceedings and those involving
dependency, neglect, or some other domestic problems. These
latter proceedings attempt to resolve matters usually concerned
with the whole fabric of a family situation and the problems involved therein. A delinquency proceeding, by contrast, has as its
primary jurisdictional base the actions of the child. It is quite
possible that a child who is engaging in antisocial conduct is doing
· so because of problems at home. In this sense, the inquiries of all
these proceedings may be directed toward solving similar problems, but this is not necessarily the case. Quite often children are
found to be delinquent in instances in which there would be no
occasion for intervention by a juvenile court under its dependency
or neglect jurisdiction. In such instances the child has done an act
which amounts merely to a crime. 3
Since the conduct upon which delinquency is based is usually
criminal in nature, 4 and since the dispositional alternatives available to the juvenile court frequently resemble the punishment
imposed upon adults, 5 it is necessary to determine to what extent
the jurisprudence of the criminal law is or should be applicable to a
delinquency proceeding. This analysis is not undertaken with the
belief that the criminal law has arrived at a state of perfection or
that it possesses all the answers to the problems of delinquency.

2
See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM
JUVENILE COURT AcT § 2(2} (1968). See also note 42 and accompanying text infra.
3
4
5

See note 58 and accompanying text infra.
See note 42 and accompanying text infra.
See note 156 and accompanying text infra.
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However, this article suggests that the principles of the criminal
law reflect important social values of which the juvenile law should
be ever mindful.
Recently the efforts of both the President's Commission of Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice 6 and the United States
Supreme Court7 have directed substantial attention to the juvenile
justice system. The decisions, legislation, and articles which have
grown out of these efforts have centered almost exclusively upon
the procedural aspects of the juvenile justice system. Such considerations are, of course, extremely important; but they alone do not
address a variety of other problems inherent in a legal system that
deals with youthful offenders, nor can they determine the proper
substantive bases upon which societal intervention should be authorized. In many respects, an exclusive preoccupation with procedural safeguards can result in a situation not unlike that described in Samuel Butler's Erewhon, in which the man was tried
with what might be perceived as the fullest of due process rights for
the offense of having contracted consumption.
In an attempt to move beyond purely procedural limitations,
therefore, this article seeks to determine the role which the concept
of criminal responsibility, or mens rea, should play in a juvenile
delinquency proceeding. Without presuming to effect any changes
in dispositional alternatives, this article seeks to illuminate the
principles of law which authorize governmental intervention in the
life of a child and his family to determine under what circumstances
a government has license to deprive a child of his liberty. To
achieve this, a brief survey will be made of the common law rules
of responsibility and the way these rules have been applied in the
juvenile courts. Then, through a consideration of the writings of
several philosophers, principles will be identified which suggest
that the concept of responsibility has a definite role to play in
juvenile law.
I. THE PRINCIPLES OF RESPONSIBILITY

A. Responsibility in the Criminal Law
It is a fundamental principle of Anglo-American criminallaw that
both actus reus and mens rea must be established before an individual may be convicted of a criminal offense. Actus reus refers to
the conduct, (taking and carrying off of the property of another),

6
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME (1967).
7

See cases at notes 48-52 and accompanying text infra.
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and sometimes the consequences (death of a human being) proscribed by the criminal law. 8 In general, this doctrine requires
act 9 by the individual which consists of a voluntary bodily movement. 10 This doctrine excludes from the criminal process those
events or results which, although prohibited by the criminal law,
are the product of an involuntary action, such as a convulsion or a
spasm, or which occur under conditions which render the action
involuntary, such as unconsciousness, sleep, or hypnosis . 11
In addition to the physical element of a crime, actus reus, the law
also requires that mens rea, the mental element of the crime, be
established. It is very difficult to state concisely or precisely what
constitutes the mental element of crimes, partly because requirements may vary from one crime to another.12 However, mens rea
can be simply defined as the intention to do the act which society
has made penal, 13 or the intent to do the act with knowledge of the
circumstances that make the act a criminal offense. 14 Only when
both actus reus and mens rea are present can an individual be held
criminally responsible. At common law this was true for children
as well as for adults.
The law, however, has always dealt with children in a somewhat
different manner than their adult counterparts. The common law
principles of capacity regarding age can be perceived as developing
three major categories. 15 First, children under seven had no crimi• For a discussion of the historical development of the doctrine of actus reus in which it is
shown that the term itself is of relatively recent origin. see J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES
OF CRIMINAL LAW 222-28 (2d ed. 1960). The doctrine itself is much older than its terminology and is a firmly rooted principle of criminal law.
9
Omissions may also be characterized as acts. Although there are differences between
acts and omissions, they are not central to our discussion here. See W. LAFAVE & A.
SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 182 (1972).
10
Id. at 179.
11
See MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.0 (2). (Prop. Official Draft L9 2, 1962). The drafters of the
Model Penal Code have made the following observations: "People whose involuntary
movements threaten hann to others may present a public health or safety problem, calling
for therapy or even for custodial commitment; they do not present a problem of correction."
12
This point was illustrated by Professors LaFave and Scott: "Crimes may be classified,
according to their mental aspects. into (I) crimes requiring subjective fault, (2) crimes
requiring objective fault, and (3) crimes imposing liability without fault. The principal types
of mental culpability in crimes requiring fault are (I) intention, (2) knowledge, (3) recklessness, and (4) negligence." W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 9, at 191.
13
See HALL, supra note 8, at 71, citing Stallybrass, in THE MODERN APPROACH i;o
CRIMINAL LAW 406 (L. Radzinowicz & J. Turner ed. 1945).
14
Id., citing Devlin. Statutory Offenses, 4 J. Soc. Pue. TEACHERS L. 213 (1958). This
definition excludes strict liability crimes, but these are virtually nonexistent in juvenile
court.
15
Under Roman law a child was not responsible until he or she had attained the age of
seven. It does not appear that infancy was a defense in the early stages of the common law.
However. children were usually pardoned for their transgressions. By the tenth century. a
statute prohibited the capital punishment of children under fifteen unless surrender was
refused or an escape was attempted. By the fourteenth century it was established that a child
was not criminally responsible until he or she reached the age of seven. In 1338 it was
determined that a child over seven was also presumed to lack capacity to commit a crime.
During this period the age at which the presumption of incapacity ceased to operate was not
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nal capacity. Second, children were held to the same standards as
adults when they attained the age of fourteen. Third, children
between the ages of seven and fourteen were presumed to be
without capacity, but this presumption could be rebutted in an
individual case. 16
These principles formed the basis of the law of responsibility for
children as it developed in the United States, 1 7 and they were
frequently adopted in many of the early commentaries on American criminal law . 18 In addition, the American case law developed
special rules of evidence which in some instances were designed to
protect children further. In both State v. Aaron 19 and State v.
Bostick, 20 the court fashioned special exclusionary rules regarding
the use of the extrajudicial confessions of children who were being
criminally prosecuted. In many respects, therefore, the law was
highly solicitous of children and as the law developed the prosecution needed to show not only that the child had the requisite intent
to commit the offense (mens rea), but also that he had the capacity
to form that intent.
The defenses available under the common law also illustrate the
rules regarding the responsibility of chilren. 21 Both the defenses of
infancy and insanity, which excluded children from legal liability,
were permitted for juvenile criminals and were perceived as being
intimately related, often by statute. 22
The insanity and infancy defenses shared a common path of
development. The various tests used to determine incapacity under
the infancy defense usually mirrored those used for insanity. The
M' Naghten 23 right-wrong test for insanity was adopted in Ameri-

clearly defined, but with a child over seven the presumption could. be rebutted. By the
seventeenth century fourteen became the age of full responsibility. See W. LAFAVE & A.
SCOTT, supra note 9, at 351.
16
Id. at 351-52. The authors also point out that the age of responsibility may have earlier
been fixed at twelve, at least for capital offenses. Id. at 352 n.7.
17
See State v. Doherty, 2 Tenn. 79 (1806); Walker's Case, 5 City-Hall Recorder 137 (New
York City 1820).
18
See, e.g .. I. BROWNE, THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 5 (1892); J. P. BISHOP,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW chp. ]3 (1796); R. BURNS, ABRIDGMENT OF THE
AMERICAN JUSTICE 248 (2d ed. 1792).
19
4 N.J.L. 231 (1818).
20
4 Del. (4 Harr.) 563 (1845).
21
See Fox, Responsibility in the Juvenile Court, 11 WM. & MARYL. REv. 659 (1970). See
also, Michael & Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide (pt. 2), 37 CoLUM. L. REV.
1261, 1265 n.15 (1937).
22
This fact was demonstrated by a colonial statute in 1641 which provided: "Children,
Idiots. Distracted Persons, and all that are strangers or new comers to our plantation, shall
have such allowances as religion and reason require." The Body of Liberties of 1641, No. 52,
in THE COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACAHUSETTS OF 1660-1672, at 45 (Whitmore ed. 1889),
quoted in Fox, supra note 21, at 660.
·
23
M'Naghten's Case, '!l Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
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can law to serve as the test for infancy as well. 24 Infancy, as a
defense peculiar to children, provides an excellent reference within
which principles of responsibility can be explored. One can more
fully comprehend the principles of responsibility in the law by
examining those who are excluded from liability. 25 Thus, if a child
was not blameworthy, or could not have been deterred because she
did not know the nature or illegality of her actions, then it was, of
course, quite logical to conclude that she was not a proper subject
for punishment. 26
It is important to note, however, that the absence of infancy and
insanity is not coextensive with the concepts of criminal responsibility embodied in the requirement of mens rea. One might have
been capable of forming a criminal intent, but not have intended
the act in any particular case. This is a simple point but one which,
if not recognized, can generate considerable confusion. It has been
suggested, for example, that "[i]nsanity and infancy constituted
the only substantive law defenses exculpatingjuvenile criminals on
grounds of irresponsibility. " 27 Obviously, this is not always the
case. Even in an action in which insanity is not raised as a defense
and in which a child is demonstrated to have the requisite capacity
(e.g., can distinguish between right and wrong), it still must be
shown that the child possessed the requisite intent to commit the
act. In addition, all defenses otherwise available to adults, such as
mistake, duress, necessity, self-defense, or consent, were applicable to juveniles.
Thus, it may be true that a person, whether adult or child, who
does not know the nature and quality of his action or who cannot
distinguish between right and wrong, lacks the capacity to form the
mental part of a crime necessary for conviction. It is not necessarily true, however, that those persons who do not successfully meet
the tests and thereby fail to establish the defense of insanity or

24
See Commonwealth v. Rogers. 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 500, 501-03 (1844). It has been
suggested that the right-wrong test was part of American jurisprudence much earlier. See
Platt & Diamond, The Origins of the "'Right and Wrong" Test of Criminal Responsibility
and Its Subsequent Development in the United States: An Historical Survey, 54 CALIF. L.
REV. 1227, 1257 (1966). For some earlier examples in which this nexus can be seen, see
Commonwealth v. French, Thacher's Criminal Cases 163, 165 (Mass. 1827); Clark's Case, I
City-Hall Recorder 177 (New York City 1816).
25
H.L.A. Hart has added much to an understanding of the principles of punishment by
employing precisely this sort of approach. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY, at 28-53 (1968).
26
See Benbow v. State, 128 Ala. 1, 29 So. 533 (1901); Price v. State, 50Tex. Crim. 71, 95
S.W. 901 (1906).
27 Fpx, supra note 21, at 659. There is no real doubt that Professor Fox understands the
distinction being made in the text. He is dealing with a very narrow issue, in which context
this statement's intent is quite clear. It is important to keep in mind the broader sphere
within which these concepts are operating, however.
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infancy are found to possess the necessary mens rea. This point is
one that anyone· who has studied criminal law even in the most
cursory way would grasp immediately. Nevertheless, some writers
on juvenile law have apparently confused these two principles. 28
It is important to note that the principles of criminal liability at
common law applied equally to both adults and children. In both
instances the criminal sanction was imposed only upon proof of the
commission of an offense and all the requisite elements, including
mens rea, of that offense. The only difference between the child
and the adult was that the former was aided by a presumption
which had the same force for those children between the ages of
seven and fourteen as that which would be occasioned by the prima
facie showing of insanity by an adult. If this obstacle to prosecution
were overcome, the principles of criminal responsibility for adults
and children were identical.
B. Responsibility in the Juvenile Court

During the nineteenth century a movement arose to seek alternative means of dealing with children apart from the criminal process.
The historical development of this reform movement and the motivations of its members are the subjects of considerable dispute. 29
Traditional accounts characterized the participants as high-minded
individuals possessing only laudable humanitarian ambitions. More
recently, commentators have portrayed these "crusaders" as conniving rascals intent only upon protecting and feeding their own
selfish interests. 30 Whether their efforts were prompted by noble or
base motives, they nevertheless achieved a significant change in
legal principles and institutions.
The first major accomplishment of the early reformers is generally recognized as the founding of the New York House of Refuge
in I 824. The act which established the House of Refuge granted the
Manager of the Society for the Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents 31 the power "to receive and take into the House of Refuge
... all such children as shall be taken up or committed as vagrants,
or convicted of criminal offenses ... as may ... be proper ob-

28

See discussion note 63 and accompanying text infra.
For an example of this debate. compare the historical accounts found in In re Gault. 387
U.S. I, 14-18 (1%7), with that found in A. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS 46-74 (1969). See
also, Fox. Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187
(1970).
30
See Fox, supra note 29, at 1225-28.
31
This society was earlier known as the Society for the Prevention of Pauperism. For an
account of the society's previous activities, see Fox. supra note 29. at 1189-92.
29
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jects.
. " 32 The act required that commitment to the House of
Refuge be made by a court of competent jurisdiction.
The concern of the reformers, however, extended far beyond
simply those children who were criminal or incorrigible. The
child-savers, as these Victorian reformers came co be called, desired to protect and salvage those children who were the victims of
vicious environments, unfortunate heredity, or cruel treatment at
the hands of parents, guardians, or employers. 33 These reformers
saw the city slums as havens for the penniless and criminal, reflecting the lowest forms of degradation and misery; they saw the
juvenile inhabitants of these areas as "moral wrecks" and "intellectual dwarfs. " 34
The reformers grew impatient while waiting for court adjudication, a prerequisite to their aid of these unfortunates. Their sentiment was that the best possible system of juvenile justice should
not separate the adjudicative and treatment functions. The reformers therefore urged the possibility of examining the potential
disposition of the child before or during the trial stage. Charles
Cooley, a noted scholar of the time, observed that if a child is going
to enter upon a criminal career, "let us try to catch him at a tender
age, and subject him to rational social discipline, such as is already
successful in enough cases to show that it might be greatly extended. " 35 The concept qf predelinquency was already manifest in
an 1823 report of the Society for the Prevention of Pauperism in the
City of New York:
Many of these are young people on whom the charge of crime
cannot be fastened, and whose only fault is, that they have no
one on earth to take care of them, and that they are incapable
of providing for themselves. Hundreds, it is believed, thus
circumstanced, eventually have recourse to petty thefts; or, if
females, they descend to practice of infamy, in order to save
themselves from the pinching assaults of cold and hunger. 36

It was felt that ''traditional forms of punishment and redemption
were not appropriate for persons who were not deserving of moral
recognition." 37 Such children were not individuals but merely the
products of their environments.
Further, the child-savers were appalled by the operation of the
32
33
34

Act of March 29, 1824, ch. 126 § 4 [1824] N .Y.
A. PLATT, supra note 29, at 36-43.
Id. at 40-41.

LAWS

111.

C. COOLEY, NATURE V. NURTURE IN MAKING OF SOCIAL CAREERS 405 (1896), quoted
PLATT, supra note 29, at 28.
36
SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF PAUPERISM IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORT ON
THE SUBJECT OF ERECTING A HOUSE OF REFUGE FOR VAGRANT AND DEPRAVED YOUNG
PEOPLE (1823), reprinted in Fox, supra note 29, at 1191 n.25.
37 A. PLATT, supra note 29, at 28.
as

in A.
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criminal process on children. The fact that children could be given
long prison terms, could be confined with hardened adult criminals, or could be placed in penal institutions at all, greatly offended
the reformers, who felt that society owed a duty to children which
extended beyond a simple concept of justice. They saw society's
role as not merely ascertaining whether the child was guilty of an
offense but also asked, ''.[w]hat is he, how has he become what he
is, and what had best be done in his interest and in the interest of
the state to save him from a downward career[?]" 38 They focused
their efforts, therefore, on removing from the child-saving institutions any idea of retribution, which they saw as solely cruel and
barbaric.
In 1899 the Illinois legislature gave the first official legislative
recognition to the juvenile court as a tribunal to serve as a
specialized court concerned with children. The enabling legislation
articulated the spirit of the reformers. "This act shall be liberally
construed to the end that its purpose may be carried out, to wit, the
care, custody and discipline of a child shall approximate as nearly
as may be that which should be given by its parents .... " 39
The Illinois Act served as a model for legislation in other
states. 40 As early as 1928 all but two states had adopted a juvenile
court system. 41 Such legislation authorized broad governmental
intervention in circumstances which had previously been ignored
by the judicial system. 42
38
Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HAltV. L. REv. 104, 119-20 (1909). But see Fox, supra
note 29, at 1238.
39
The act provided that the juvenile court was to have jurisdiction over any child who:
is destitute or homeless or abandoned; or dependent upon the public for support, or
has not proper parental care or guardianship; or who habitually begs or receives
alms; or who is found living in any house of ill fame or with any vicious or
disreputable person; or whose home, by reason of neglect, cruelty or depravity on
the part of its parents, guardian, or other person in whose care it may be, is an unfit
place for such a child; and any child under the age of 8 years who is found peddling
or selling any article or singing or playing any musical instrument upon the streets
or giving any public entertainment.
Act of April 21, 1899, ILL. LAWS 131. For a discussion of the regressive side of this act, see
Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform, supra note 29, at 1221-30.
.
40
Juvenile courts were established in Wisconsin (1901), New York (1901), Ohio (1902),
Maryland (1902), and Colorado (1903).
·
41
A. PLATT, supra note 29, at 139.
42
Broadly defined jurisdiction remained until very recently. In 1959 Frederick Sussmann
compiled the following list of acts or conditions included in delinquency definitions or
descriptions. They are presented in decreasing order of frequency.
I. Violates any law or ordinance
2. Habitually truant
3. (Knowingly) associates with thieves, vicious or immoral persons
4. Incorrigible
5. Beyond control of parent or guardian
6. Growing up in idleness or crime
7. So deports self as to injure or endanger self or others
8. Absents self from home (without just cause) without consent
9. Immoral or indecent conduct
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The theory behind such widespread jurisdiction was that the
state would assume the role of a beneficent parent who would act
in the best interest of the child. Legislatures found support for this
idea in the chancery doctrine of parens patriae and in cases such as
Regina v Gynga/1, 43 where it was stated:
[T]he jurisdiction ... arising as it does from the power of the
Crown delegated to the Court of Chancery, ... is essentially a
parental jurisdiction, and that description ofit involves that the
main consideration to be acted upon in its exercise is the
benefit or welfare of the child. Again, the term "welfare" in
this connection must be read in its largest possible sense, that
is to say, as meaning that every circumstance must be taken
into consideration, and the Court must do what under the
circumstances a wise parent acting for the true interests of the
child would or ought to do. 44
In line with this approach, reformers asserted that delinquency
proceedings were equitable or civil in nature. Thus, the whole body
of criminal jurisprudence was irrelevant to the administration of
juvenile justice. Since punishment was not a consequence of delinquency proceedings and only those dispositions which would best

10. (Habitually) uses vile, obscene or vulgar language (in public place)
11. (Knowingly) enters, visits house of ill repute
12. Patronizes, visits policy shop or gaming place
13. (Habitually) wanders about railroad yards or tracks
14. Jumps t~ains or enters car or engine without authority
15. Patronizes saloon or dram house where intoxicating liquor is sold
16. Wanders streets at night, not on lawful business
17. Patronizes public poolroom or bucketshop
18. Immoral conduct around school (or in public place)
19. Engages in illegal occupation
20. In occupation or situation dangerous or injurious to self or others
21. Smokes cigarettes (or uses tobacco in any form)
22. Frequents place whose existence violates law
23. Is found in place for permitting which adult may be punished
24. Addicted to drugs
25. Disorderly
26. Begging
27. Uses intoxicating liquor
28. Makes indecent proposal
29. Loiters, sleeps in alleys, vagrant
30. Runs away from state or charity institution
31. Found on premises occupied or used for illegal purposes
32. Operates motor vehicle dangerously while under the influence of liquor
33. Attempts to marry without consent, in violation of law
34. Given to sexual irregularities
F. SusSMANN, LAW OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 21 (rev. 2d ed. 1959).
43
2 Q.B. 233 (1893).
44
Id. at 248. The fact that the jurisdiction of the Chancery Court as parens patriae was
exercised almost exclusively in cases where the property rights of minors were in jeopardy
was ignored. See THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 2
(1967).
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aid the child's development were to be permitted, there was no
need to follow the rigid definitions of the criminal law, or the
procedural safeguards necessary in criminal prosecutions. Such
formalities would only hamper or impede the provision of help to
the child.
The reformers articulated no real distinction between neglected
children and delinquent children. They felt that all children under
fourteen "may be classed together ... for there is no distinction
between pauper, vagrant, and criminal children, which would require a different system of treatment. " 45 The objective of the
philosophy was that the government provide the necessary help
and guidance to children who might otherwise embark upon a life
of crime. The theory was prediction-oriented because it sought to
direct potential offenders toward lives as good citizens. Whether
the child had already committed a crime or whether he was simply
growing up in poverty or idleness had no real significance other
than to serve as a signal that he might one day be the grist of the
criminal law mill. The reformers viewed the child's status or conduct, in almost medical terms, as the symptom of an oncoming
disease. 46
This view of governmental obligations and solicitude has served
as a justification for the juvenile justice system to the present.
Although there have been numerous attacks launched against the
system on a variety of grounds, most have been successfully met
by the mere incantation of the "best interest of the child" refrain.47
The juvenile justice system was not significantly rocked until
1967 when the United States Supreme Court decided what has
been hailed as a landmark case, In re Gault. 48 That case, which
involved entirely procedural issues, held that a child charged with a
criminal offense in the juvenile court must be provided with some
of the safeguards available in a criminal prosecution. 49 The subsequent Supreme Court cases of In re Winship, 50 McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 51 and Breed v. Jones, 52 further delineated the pro-

45
M. CARPENTER, WHAT SHOULD BE DONE FOR THE NEGLECTED AND CRIMINAL CHILDREN OF THE UNITED STATES (1885), quoted in Fox, supra note 29, at 1193.
46
It has been suggested that there was a darker side to this philosophy. For a more
detailed discussion of the regressive side of this movement. see Fox. supra note 29. at
1193-95.
41
See, e.g .. In re Gault. 387 U.S. I. 15 (1967).
48
387 U.S. I (1.967).
49
The Court held that the child must be afforded I) Notice of the charges, 2) Right to
counsel, 3) Right to confrontation and cross-examination. and 4) Privilege against selfincrimination. The Court refused to declare a constitutionally required right to a transcript of
the proceedings. or to appellate review.
so 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).
51
403 U.S. 528 (1971) (no right to jury trial).
52
421 U.S. 519 (1975) (double jeopardy applicable to juvenile proceedings).
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cedural aspects which were to be observed by the juvenile court.
The Court attempted to walk a narrow line between what it recognized as the obviously laudatory objective of the juvenile court and
what it recognized as the clearly penal character of the dispositions
being made by those courts. Since the statute which provided for
Gault's commitment and the whole history of juvenile court commitments in general were perceived as civil in nature, the Supreme
Court stopped short of declaring a delinquency proceeding to be a
criminal prosecution. The Court made it clear, however, that a
"proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found
'delinquent' and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is
comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution. " 53
These decisions had the immediate effect of giving certain rights
to a child against whom a petition alleging delinquency was lodged.
Several states subsequently undertook a revision of their juvenile
court statutes in an attempt to establish different categories of
children whose conduct was called into question and the procedures for and means of dealing with these children. 54 Previously, in
many states the category of delinquent included behavior by children which was deemed offensive or dangerous but which was not
criminal. 55 When the revisions of these codes were undertaken,
many states reserved the category of "delinquent" for those instances in which the conduct was such that it amounted to a
criminal offense. 56 Legislators felt that the Gault decision would
cover only these cases. Other categories were established to cover
the non-criminal conduct of children which would remain the object of scrutiny by the juvenile court. 57
Even though most states now require the child to commit an act
which would amount to a crime if she were an adult before the child
may be found delinquent, they have attached very little significance to the general principles of criminal liability in substantive
law terms when a d~termination of delinquency is being made. It is
not entirely clear in juvenile law today whether the government
must establish that the child possessed the requisite mens rea to

387 u .s. I. 36.
See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE § 2151.01 (Page 1973) which went into effect in 1969.
55
See note 48 supra. '
56 Typical is the Uniform Juvenile Court Act which provides that a " 'delinquent act'
means an act designated a crime under the law, including local [ordinances] or resolutions of
this state, or of another state if the act occurred in that state, or under federal law .... "
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM
JUVENILE COURT ACT § 2(2) (1968).
57 Tlie Uniform Juvenile Court Act uses the category "unruly." The Comment to the
section states: "The 'unruly child' category is needed to limit the disposition that can be
made of a child who is in need of treatment or rehabilitation, but who has committed no
offense applicable to adults .... " Id. at § 2t4).
53

54
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commit the offense, or simply whether she performed an act which
was proscribed by the criminal law regardless of her intent. Part of
the uncertainty stems from the language legislators employed when
defining delinquency.
The New York Family Court Act, for example, defines a juvenile
delinquent as "a person over 7 and less than 16 years of age who
does any act which, if done by an adult would constitute a
crime. " 58 By its choice of words, did the New York legislature
intend to focus exclusively on the actus reus element of an offense?
The legislature may only have been attempting to set a finding of
delinquency apart from a criminal conviction and ·chose those
words to impart that significance. A strict statutory interpretation,
however, could conclude that mens rea is irrelevant to a finding of
delinquency.
It is not necessary to strain at statutory construction, however,
for cases have arisen which indicate the juvenile court has departed
from the traditional principles of responsibility. In In re DiMaggio, 59 a thirteen-year-old boy was found delinquent after he had
discharged a revolver and injured another child. The juvenile court
specifically found that DiMaggio did not willfully discharge the
gun, that he did not intend to inflict any injury, and that what had
occurred was purely accidental. 60 The court nevertheless found the
child to be delinquent. The court did begin to perceive the implications of such a holding and avoided confronting the mens rea and
actus reus problems by finding that the child had violated a law
requiring all persons in possession of certain firearms to have a
permit. The boys father, who owned the gun, had a valid permit,
but since the child did not have a permit when he "possessed" the
gun, he had committed an offense under the law.
It is unclear from the opinion whether the court considered the
offense to be one of strict liability for which no intent was necessary. The court did, nowever, discuss the question of whether the
child was presumed to know the firearms law, and concluded that
although it was a fiction, the child was nevertheless bound by that
presumption. 61 By employing this device the court demonstrated
its appreciation of the problems involved but chose to skirt them.
In another case, the attitude of the juvenile court concerning
responsibility became evident when held up to scrutiny by an
appellate court. In In re Glassberg, 62 a juvenile court had also

58
59
60
61

62

NEW YORK FAMILY COURT AcT § 712(a) (McKinney 1970) (emphasis added} ..
65 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Dom. Rel. Ct. Kings County 1946).
Id. at 614.
Id. at 615.
230 La. 395. 88 So.2d 707 (1956).
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found a child delinquent on the basis of an accidental shooting. In
this case, however, the Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the
judgment and held that intent was a necessary element to establish
the offense of delinquency. While this case ostensibly holds that
mens rea and actus reus are required in a delinquency action, the
decision of the juvenile court provides some evidence which shows
the tendency to ignore these requirements in order to provide
treatment to a child seen to be in need.
DiMaggio and Glassberg are the only reported decisions which
have been found which determine whether mens rea, or the volitional aspect of actus reus is required in juvenile court. Further, no
reported decisions have been found, other than cases dealing with
infancy or insanity, in which a defense of the criminal law was
presented which· would make the child's act excusable or justifiable. 63
Although many defenses in the criminal law serve to negate the
mental element of an offense, it is by no means certain which
defenses a juvenile court will recognize. A juvenile court, for
example, might be quite willing to accept the defense of ignorance
or mistake of fact which would, in some circumstances, eliminate a
culpable intent. If a child honestly thought that he was entering his
grandmother's house, for instance, when in fact the child was
entering the home of another, it would seem unlikely that any
juvenile court would find him delinquent based on an unlawful
entry. However no reported decisions have been found showing
whether this defense would be available, or whether if the child
needed some treatment, even if it were independent of this act, the
act would still serve as a basis for a finding of delinquency. No
reported decisions address the use of other defenses under the
criminal law by juvenile courts, regardless of whether the defense
arose from the mental element of the offense, or from a social
policy, such as that involved in the case of duress.
One unpublished opinion candidly discussed the role of mens rea
in juvenile proceedings. In In re Betty Jean Williams, 64 the court
held that because the purpose of the juvenile court was to provide
treatment, the principle of mens rea was inappropriate. The court
reasoned that mens rea was an adjunct of punishment and consequently was unnecessary when punishment was not involved. 65
Although In re Betty Jean Williams predated the Gault decision by
See note 67 and accompanying text infra.
Unpublished opinion, Juvenile Court for the District of Columbia. Docket No. 27-220-J
(Oct. 20, 1959), reprinted in Westbrook, Mens Rea in the Juvenile Court 5 J. FAM. L. 121
63

64

(1%5).
65

The Court stated:
Counsel's motion also states that an assessment of respondent's mental state as of
the time of the alleged delinquency is required. This appears to involve a serious
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almost a decade, there has been no apparent change in attitude
since Gault. This can be seen in the manner in which courts have
dealt with the defenses of infancy and insanity.
Until 1970 when In re Gladys R. 66 was decided, there was
unanimous rejection of the infancy defense by every court that
faced the issue. 67 The Supreme Court of California, however,
concluded that infancy was a defense to a delinquency proceeding. 68 This decision, however, turned entirely upon a peculiar
California statute, 6 !i and does not appear to have gained acceptance
elsewhere.
A similar pattern emerges when the insanity defense is considered. Although several cases have raised the issue, it is far from
clear how extensively this defense is recognized. 70 In/n re H. C., 71
the court held that insanity was not a bar to a finding of delinquency. In support of this conclusion, the court pointed out, "The
inquiry is and must be, 'Was the act committed?' To hold insanity
applicable as a defense to adjudicate would handcuff the court, run
contrary to the basic theory of juvenile proceedings, and not be in
the best interests of the juvenile himself. " 72
Other cases have recognized insanity as a defense, but this
position has not gained any appreciable acceptance because the
resolution of the cases tended to turn either upon special statutes in
that jurisdiction or upon special circumstances. 73
misconception of the philosophy and spirit of the Juvenile Court Act .... Free
will. evil intent, moral responsibility and proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
are the language of the criminal code. They encompass a design of punishment to
be meted out to those who offend against the social order .... But where the
protection rather than punishment of the offender is the aim, where the action of
the state is on behalf of the law violator as well as in the interests of the community,
such criminal concepts require qualification .... The more thorough-going expert
investigation necessary to provide the trier of facts with information essential for a
proper determination of the act alleged assumes that the question of criminal
responsibility is at stake. It assumes that mens rea is an essential issue and that
severe injustice would be done if the accused were punished for an act which he
could not. of his free will, commit by reason of mental defect or disease. In the case
at bar, neither assumption is well founded. Id.
66
I Cal. 3d 855, 464 P.2d 127, 83 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1970).
67
Fox. Responsibility in the Juvenile Court, 11 WM. & MARYL. REV. 659,.667 (1970).
68
83 Cal. Rptr. 671, 464 P.2d 127 (1970).
69
The court found applicable to delinquency proceedings a statute which provided that all
persons are capable of committing crimes except those belonging to the following classes:
"[C]hildren under the age of fourteen in the absence of clear proof that at the time of
committing the act charged against them, they knew its wrongfulness." CAL. PENAL CooE §
26 (West 1955). This holding rested upon a questionable interpretation of legislative intent.
See Fox, supra note 67, at 668-72.
70
See Donovan. The Juvenile Court and the Mentally Disordered Juvenile, 45 N.D.L.
REV. 222 (1939). Donovan points to ten instances in which the insanity defense was raised
but does not reveal the rate of success. Id. at 233 n.33.
71
106 N.J. Super. 583, 256 A.2d 322 (Juv. and Dom. Rel. Ct., Morris Cty. 1969).
72
Id. at 595, 256 A.2d at 328.
73
See. e.g .. In re Winburn, 32 Wis.2d 152, 145 N.W.2d 178 (1966), where the court found
that juvenile court procedures authorized incarcerating juveniles for purposes other than
treatment.

196

Journal of Law Reform

[VoL. IO: 181

The problem of determ"ining the applicability of the mens rea
doctrine and, consequently, the availablity of several defenses in
the juvenile court is complicated by the intake procedure employed
by the juvenile court which allows for early diversion of the children from the system, thus, frequently precluding confrontation of
these issues. 74 Undoubtedly, the major difficulty in assessing the
applicabilty of mens rea is caused by the general lack of official
reporting of juvenile cases. 75 As a result, it is unclear what the state
of the law is in most jurisdictions, and perhaps even less clear what
the state of the law should be. 76

II. RESPONSIBILITY IN CLASSICAL PHILOSOPHIES
Whether the principles of criminal responsibility which are embodied in the term mens rea should apply to the juvenile court is a
question which does not lend itself to a simple solution. Indeed, the
use of the concept of responsibility as a valid element in adult
criminal law has been the subject of considerable debate. 77 Lady
Barbara Wooton is one of the leading proponents of the position
which seeks to eliminate mens rea as a necessary element for
societal intervention in adult cases. She has made arguments to
abolish the principle of mens rea which in many respects sound
much like those employed to justify the operations of the juvenile
court. Indeed, she has proposed the model which might be seen as
a prototype for the juvenile court.
Lady Wooton has insisted that the whole philosophy of criminal
responsibility is a mistake. 78 She suggests that the criminal law
would be much more effective and more sensible if the court
considered the state or condition of a criminal defendant's mind
only at a dispositional state of the proceedings. That is, if it could
be shown that the defendant did indeed kill another person, the
state should be authorized to deal with that individual. In attempting to deal with the person, the state's primary purpose would be to

See s. Fox, JUVENILE COURTS IN A NUTSHELL 151 (1971) .•
See notes 64-65 and accompanying text supra.
76 This is amply demonstrated in the debate which took place between then Judge Burger
and Judge Bazelon in Kent v. United States, 130 U.S. App.D.C. 343,401 F.2d 408 (1968). In
that case the question arose whether a mentally disturbed child should be civilly committed
or proceeded against in the juvenile court. The majority, per Bazel on. concluded that civil
commitment was the appropriate vehicle, not a delinquency action.
77 See, e.g., Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense" - Why Not-?, 72 YALE
L.J. 853 (1963).
78
See B. WOOTON, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND SOCIAL PATHOLOGY (1959); CRIME AND THE
CRIMINAL LAW (1963).
74

75
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determine whether it is likely that such an event will occur again. If
it is, the state must devise some means of preventing such future
behavior. Presumably, Lady Wooton would also permit the state to
treat an individual for any other problems he might have which
could result in future antisocial behavior, even if the problems
were not the cause of this particular event.
Lady Wooton's contention is that mens rea enters the criminal
process at the wrong place. 79 She maintains that it is a useless
practice to attempt to determine the state of the defendant's mind
at the time of the offense. The actor's state of mind at the time of
the offense is only relevant to the extent that it bears upon the
likelihood of future inappropriate conduct. 80
The challenges to the principles of criminal responsibility illustrate that the bases of these principles must be understood to
determine the proper ambit of the concept of responsibility and to
ascertafo whether it should be operative in the juvenile court in a
delinquency proceeding; Any theory of criminal responsibility
must, of necessity, be derived from an analysis of the aims or
purposes of the criminal law itself. Since the criminal law has
generally employed sanctions or punishments to deal with transgressors, the initial question therefore is why we punish. It is only
after this has been decided that we can determine whom society
may legitimately punish. At the heart of the question of who may
be punished is the concept of responsibility. Several writers have
addressed these questions and it will be helpful, therefore, to
examine and consider the implications of their diverse philosophic_al theories.
The first group is discussed under the heading. of a "better
person" theory. The second includes both the classical and modem utilitarian philosophy. Both of these groups find a justification
for punishment in the ends which are served by it. In this sense the
philosophies are teleological, (oriented toward ends or purposes).
The third group differs significantly from the first two and is considered under the heading of retribution. The discussion is not
intended as a full exposition of these schools of thought, but rather
79

8.

WOOTON, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW

52 (1963).

so Lady Wooton has written:

If the object of the criminal law is to prevent the occurrence of socially damaging
actions. it would be absurd to tum a blind eye to those which were due to
carelessness, negligence or even accident. The question of motivation is iq the first
instance irrelevant.
But only in the first instance. At a later stage, that is to say, after what is now
known as a conviction, the presence or absence of guilty intention is all-important
for its effect on the appropriate measures to be taken to prevent a recurrence of the
forbidden act. The prevention of accidental deaths presents different problems
from those involved in the prevention of wilful murders.
Id. at 52-53.
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as a method to simply isolate certain principles against which the
concept of responsibility can be examined.
A. Better Person Theory

The frame of reference for the first group of teleological
philosophers is that of the individual himself. Plato saw crime as
being closely analogous to sickness and believed that an individual
could be cured only through punishment. 81 Ideas similar to this can
be found in the writings of Aristotle 82 and Hegel. 83 The central
theme is that punishment operates to make an individual a better
person. The objective is not to coerce the wrongdoer into simply
avoiding certain kinds of behavior, but to drive home to him the
moral implications of the conduct, thereby making the person more
moral.
As noble as such an ambition might be in the sphere of private
ethics, there is room for some substantial reservations about allowing such a philosophy to serve as a societal justification for the
practice of punishment. 84 The real issue is whether the purpose of
the criminal law, and perhaps even law in general, is to make
people morally upright or merely to stop them from engaging in
certain kinds of activity. The "better person" theorists seem to
subscribe to the former objective, while as a society, we seem
more inclined to the latter. Although society hopes that an individual will recognize the moral implications of his actions, it appears that the major concern is with outwardly directed behavior.
B. Utilitarian Theories

In contrast to those who saw punishment as serving a useful
purpose for the individual, a second group of writers justify
punishment on the basis of the good it achieves for society at large.
Within this school of thought, known as utilitarianism, there are
several different sub-groups which seek to justify punishment with
an eye toward the same general objective but which proceed from
differing basic assumptions. For example, one may proceed on the

81
PLATO, GoRGIAS, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO (E. Hamilton & H. Cairns
ed. 1961).
82
ARISTOTLE, NrcHOMACf-!EAN ETHICS, bk. III, ch. 5.
83 See McTaggart, Hegel's Theory of Punishment, 6 INT'L. J. ETHICS 482-99 (1896),
partially reprinted in G. EZ0RSKY, PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 40

(1971).
84 Of course there may be some doubt that either Plato or Aristotle offered it as a societal
justification. It is helpful, however, if a perspective on the problem can be maintained. That
is, even if one does not subscribe fully to their system of private ethics, there are points
relevant to our discussion which are nt,vertheless applicable.
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basis of a view of man which is highly rationalistic. A second may
adopt a totally deterministic perspective. And yet a third might
argue that both rationality and determinism play important parts.
Despite these differences, all find a justification for punishment in
the useful purposes it serves for society. For this reason they are
discussed together.
The classical utilitarian theory finds its most forceful expression
in the writings of Jeremy Bentham. His theory of punishment may
be seen as a narrower aspect of a much larger general theory of
ethics. 85 In terms of governmental operation, Bentham and other
classical utilitarians seek to promote the greatest good for the
greatest number, or conversely to reduce the greatest amount of
suffering for the greatest number. 86 The criminal law, and hence
punishment, are devices which may be employed to accomplish
this end. 87
The classical utilitarian theory of punishment relies upon a view
of humanity in which reason will always dictate the course of
action. In contrast, more recent writers, such as B. F. Skinner88
and Karl Menninger, 89 have argued that behavior often results
from previous conditioning, disease, or other external causes quite
independent of the faculty of reason. It is much more enlightening
to examine the specific means through which utilitarians achieve
their objectives, rather than simply to discuss the philosophies in a
vacuum.
1. Incapacitation - The simplest and most obvious means of
preventing the commission of an offense is through the use of
physical restraint. So long as a person is confined, there will be
little likelihood of his committing any crimes against society at
large. There may, therefore, be instances in which an individual is
so likely to commit serious offenses that the only means of dealing

85

As stated by Bentham:
By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of
every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to
augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in questi~n: or,
what is the same thing in other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness. I say
of every action whatsoever; and therefore not only of every action of a private
individual, but of every measure of government.
J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION, chp. I,
§ II, reprinted in THE UTILITARIANS 73 (Doubleday ed. 1961).
86
See, e.g., G. ·E. MOORE, ETHICS I (1912).
87
In Bentham's words:
The business of government is to promote the happiness of the society by punishing
and rewarding. That part of its business which consists in punishing is more
particularly the subject of penal law. In proportion as an act tends to disturb that
happiness, in proportion as the tendency of it ·is pernicious, will be the demand it
creates for punishment.
BENTHAM, supra note 85.
88
B. F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY (1971).
89
K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT (1966).
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with him is by permanent incarceration. In the case of a
psychopathic killer, for example, the only effective means of preventing future deaths 'may be indefinite confinement. 90
Undoubtedly, other factors beyond merely restraining an individual are involved in considering the purposes of the criminal law.
It is important to note at this point, however, that even in a system
of juvenile justice, it may be necessary to resort to this idea on
occasion. This fact was recognized by the President's Commission
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. 91 It is important to consider how compatible such a theory is with a philosophy
which seeks only to serve the best interest of a child.
2. Deterrence-The idea of deterrence is central to the purpose
of preventing criminal actions in a utilitarian philosophy. Classical
utilitarians argue that either the threat or the actual imposition of
punishment will inhibit most of the members of society from engaging in criminal activity. Two different types of deterrence can be
achieved by the threat or imposition of punishment and are generally referred to as special and general deterrence.
a. Special Deterrence- In the classical theory utilitarians
relied upon a hedonistic pleasure-pain model in which an individual
would calculate the "cost" of the crime. If the individual were
forced by the government to realize that the pain or "cost" of the
crime, namely the punishment, was not worth the pleasure or
benefit of the crime, then presumably she would cease engaging in
that conduct. 92
A number of criticisms have been raised regarding the practice of
special deterrence. 93 The first line of criticism derives from the
empirical studies which have been done on recidivism rates among
offenders, and which indicate that the theories do not hold up in
practice. 94 Studies which have attempted to evaluate the perform90

The death penalty is certainly the most complete form of incapacitation. Professor
Packer has observed that if a society were "simple-mindedly devoted to the repression of
crime as a paramount objective of social life. incapacitation would be the most immediately
plausible utilitarian justification for the punishment of offenders." H. PACKER, THE LIMITS
OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 48 (1968).
91
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 44, at 9.
92
BENTHAM, supra note 85, at chs. 12-15. Although not properly part of the classical
theory, the much more popular notion today of treatment, which is of course at the heart of
juvenile justice, may, from society's point of view, achieve the same end. Under the
classical view of special deterrence, an individual would be frightened away from engaging
in the proscribed behavior because he is painfully aware of the cost. Under a treatment
theory, presumably, the individual would lose his inclination to act in that manner because
the original disorder which caused the behavior has been rectified. Nevertheless, in both
instances there is a concern that the individual not engage in future antisocial acts. See, e.g.,
Lehman, Medical Model of Treatment, 18 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 204 (1972).
93
See H. PACKER, supra note 90, at 46.
94
Professor Packer has pointed out that:
Although there is much disagreement over specific figures and even more over
their significance, it is universally recognized that persons who have served prison
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ance of juvenile institutions have also cast doubt upon their effec.tiveness.95 However, there is a variety of reasons which may
account for high recidivism rates other than simply the failure of
special deterrence. 96
Further, in most instances special deterrence is not the only
justification for the practice of punishment. Even in the classical
utilitarian philosophy several other reasons justify the imposition
of punishment. 97 If special deterrence offers some additional subbenefit to these other theories, that can only be a factor in its favor.
Moreover, if the goal of rehabilitation or treatment is part of or an
ally of the theory of special deterrence, the fault may be with the
present inability to provide effective treatment rather than-with the
theory which indicates that it ought to be provided. 98 We must
inquire whether our inability to provide treatment discredits any
justification predicated upon it. Such a consideration is of
paramount concern to a justification of juvenile court practice,
where the sole objective, theoretically, is to do what is in the best
interest of the child. If treatment cannot be supplied, it follows that
any intervention by the juvenile court which is premised exclusively on treatment is unjustifiable.
A second objection to the idea of special deterrence is the extent
to which a utilitarian might go in order to accomplish it. In a
classical Benthamite model, punishment is viewed as an evil, and
only that amount of punishment which will make the pain slightly
greater than the pleasure of the offense is justified. 99
If a relatively trivial offense could be deterred only by a rather
harsh punishment, and if no greater damage would be done to

sentences have a high rate of reconviction, perhaps as inuch as fifty percent.
Superficially, this well-documented fact does appear to raise substantial questions
about the efficacy of special deterrence.
Id. Most of the studies have concluded that the actual effects of punitive measures do not
live up to the theory of special deterrence. When the focus is shifted to treatment type
programs, it may be that the practice does not live up to the theory. See, G. HUGHES,
SOCIAL JUSTICE 215 (1968); W. ELDRIDGE, NARCOTICS AND THE LAW 154 (2d ed. 1967).
95
See Lerman, Evaluative Studies of Institutions for Delinquents, reprinted in DELINQUENCY AND SOCIAL POLICY, at 236-49 (P. Lerman ed. 1970).
96
Professor Packer has identified several factors which should be considered. They
include the character of the individuals. the types of offenses, and the severity of the
punishment. H. PACKER, supra note 90, at 46.
91
See note 103 and accompanying text infra.
98
See note 95 supra.
99
The punishment should be only that which is absolutely necessary.
Every punishment which does not arise from absolute necessity, says the great
Montesquieu, is tyrannical. A Proposition which may be made more general, thus.
Every act of authority of one man over another, for which there is not an absolute
necessity, is tyrannical. It is upon this then, that the sovereign's right to punish
crimes is founded: that is, upon the necessity of defending the public liberty,
entrusted to his care, from the usurpation of individuals; and punishments are just
in proportion, as the liberty preserved by the sovereign, is sacred and valuable.
C. BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 165 (London ed. 1775).
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society by punishing the offender rather than not punishing him,
would it be justifiable? Although Bentham provides certain standards regarding the degree of punishment which may be imposed, it
is not at all certain that they resolve this question. 100
Indeed, it seems that a true utilitarian position requires approval
of a harsh punishment if it is the only means of eliminating the
,conduct which society has determined must be eliminated. This
problem is updated and complicated further by the proposal regarding penal reform made by Dr. Karl Menninger to the American Bar
Association. After outlining a variety of proposals, Dr. Menninger
stated:
[A psychiatric perspective] entails certain radical changes in
penal practice including (a) substitution of the idea of treatment, painful or otherwise, for the idea of retributive punishment, (b) the release of prisoners upon discharge or parole only
after complete and competent psychiatric examination with
findings favorable for successful rehabilitation, to which end
the desirability ofresident psychiatrists in all penal institutions
is obvious, (c) the permanent legal detention of the incurably
inadequate, incompetent and anti-social, irrespective of the
particular offense committed, (d) the use of this "permanently
custodial group" for the advantage of the State - to earn their
keep.101

With the exception of the permanent custodial aspect of this
statement, it seems that Menninger's proposal could be substituted
for the working plan of most juvenile courts today. The question
which is merely raised at this point is whether ''treatment, painful
or otherwise," is justified "irrespective of the particular offense."
Would, for example, the making of an obscene phone call justify
"treatment" for a possible six-year period? 102
b. General Deterrence- The utilitarian idea of general deterrence is predicated upon the value of a threat as a means of social
control. Criminal legislation is seen as an announcement to society
that certain actions are not allowed. Through this announcement
and through the accompanying threat which sets forth the consequences which will befall an individual who engages in this conduct, society attempts to insure that fewer of these acts will take

See E. PINCOFFS, THE RATIONALE OF LEGAL PUNISHMENT 81-94 (1%6).
Menninger, The Psychatrist in Relation to Crime 51 A.B.A. REP. 751, 757 (1926)
(emphasis <idded).
102
See In re Gault, 387 U.S. I (1%7). This discussion leads to the question of proportionality between crime and punishment. Although this is intimately related to a sense of justice,
it is somewhat beyond the scope of this article. It does, nevertheless, raise interesting
problems which should be explored.
JOO
101
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place. 103 To a large extent the effectiveness of such an endeavor
depends upon the members of the community performing an arithmetic evaluation of pain versus pleasure; if the cost outweighs the
benefit to be derived from crime, then, presumably, individuals
will not pursue criminal behavior. 104
Critics argue, however, th~t such theories, which rely upon
rational calculation, are based on a shallow psychological
model, 105 and that in reality members of society are driven largely
by unconscious motives, acting without reflection upon the rational principles of the pleasure-pain formula. Although there is a
great deal of validity to the claim that the classical utilitarian model
does not give a complete picture of human nature, perhaps the
psychological critics of that model have not given a complete
picture either. 106 It is quite possible that both rational and unconscious motives exist in most human conduct.
The question which naturally arises in the context of general
deterrence is to what extent would there be violation of the law if
the threats of criminal sanctions were removed. In the majority of
cases people might refrain from the commission of crimes on moral
grounds quite independent of any threats of penalty. However, the
criminal law itself may provide a valuable stimulus to the socialization process through which patterns of behavior are formed.
Through these processes the law may illuminate moral considerations and subconsciously and consciously reinforce decisions regarding moral conduct in the same way that other institutions of
society, such as the family, the school, the church, and the com103

See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 6 (1968).
Much has been written regarding the certainty of apprehension as a factor which can
determine whether an individual engages in criminal conduct. Obviously, this is another
factor which may be necessary to insert in the pleasure-pain formula. It does not, of course,
deny the validity of the theory itself. See, e.g., H. PACKER, supra note 90, at 40-41; Michael
& Wechsler, supra note 21, at 1264-70.
105
See J. ELLINGSTON, PROTECTING OUR CHILDREN FROM CRIMINAL CAREERS 43
(1948), quoted in Ball, The Deterrence Concept in Criminology and Law, 46 J. CRIM. L. C.
& P.S. 347, 351 (1955).
106
Professor Packer has illustrated the problems involved in the following way:
The psychological critics reject the reality of [the Benthamite model]. In doing so,
they substitute for it a model of man as governed by largely ·unconscious drives
.... The psychological model, if I may call it that, represents the criminal as
murderer - and not as murderer for profit but as perpetrator of the crime of
passion. He is the man who kills on impulse because he hates his father, he is
sexually inadequate, he lacks control, and so forth .... The Benthamite model
may well be a more nearly accurate representation of the acquisitive criminal; the
burglar, the embezzler, the con man. Perhaps the purest modem instance is the
man who cheats on his income tax.
H. PACKER, supra note 90, at 41. To expand upon Professor Packer's point, it must also be
quite obvious that once one chooses the model of an individual who has broken the law, the
majority of society has been excluded from consideration. The validity or effectiveness of
the theory of general deterrence is, therefore, not necessarily discredited by pointing to
those for whom it has not accomplished its purpose since it may. have operated effectively in
the majority of cases.
104
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munity, do. 107 Further, although there have been few instances
from which empirical conclusions can be drawn regarding this
question, those few occasions in which threats of criminal sanctions have been removed seem to indicate that moral convictions
alone do not suffice to keep the crime rate down. One example
occurred in 1919 when the Liverpool police force went on strike.
The following official report was made:
[T]he strike was accompanied by threats, violence and intimidation on the part of lawless persons. Many assaults on the
constables who remained on duty were committed. Owing to
the sudden nature of the strike the authorities were afforded no
opportunity to make adequate provision to cope with the situation. Looting of shops commenced about IO p.m. on August
1st, and continued for some days. In all about 400 shops were
looted. Military were requisitioned, special constables sworn
in, and police brought in from other centers. 108

Although many authorities support the theories of general deterrence, there has been great reluctance on the part of the juvenile
court even to acknowledge an acquaintanceship with it. 109 There
would perhaps be grounds for a charge of philosophical inconsistency if a system which asserted as its sole concern the best
interest of a child were found to be engaged in an attempt at
intimidating others by punishing a child when her "best interests"
would not counsel it. It should be recognized, however, that even if
the focus remained solely on the child, the manner in which a child,
or many children, are treated by the court filters back to the
community and generates general deterrence as a byproduct. 110
Few would seriously suggest that a child ought to be punished
simply to deter others from engaging in a particular sort of behavior. This thought, however, raises a fundamental question in

107

See

·H.L.A. }!ART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW

23-23, 168-69, 175-76 (1961).

156-57
(1940). Denmark experienced a similar situation in 1944 when German forces arrested the
entire police force.
During the remainder of the occupation period all policing was performed by an
improvised unarmed watch corps, who were ineffective except in those instances
when they were able to capture the criminal red handed. The general crime rate
rose immediately, but there was a great discrepancy between the various types of
crime .... Unfortunately, none of the reports tells us whether the rise in criminality was due to increased activity among established criminals or whether noncriminals participated as well.
Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, I 14 U. PA. L. REV. 949, 961-62
(1966).
109 See Fox, Philosophy and the Principles of Punishment in the Juvenile Court, 8 FAM.
L. Q. 373, 383-84 (1974).
11
Conversely if no deterrence is perceived it will be reflected in the community. See
Morgan, They think"/ can kill because I'm 14," N.Y. Times, Jan. 19; 1975, Magazine, at !1.
108

°

H. MANNHEIM, SOCIAL ASPECTS OF CRIME IN ENGLAND BETWEEN THE WARS

W1NTER

1977]

Responsibility in Juvenile Delinquency

205

terms of the utilitarian philosophy, namely who may be punished?
The standard utilitarian answer to the question is: only an offender
who has broken the law. 111 While such an answer sounds very
much like the retributionist response, 112 it could also be justified on
totally utilitarian grounds. 113
Nevertheless, a number of writers have expressed suspicion of
the utilitarian limitations on the question of who may be punished
as well as on the question of the extent to which an individual may
be punished. 114 The major criticism is that a utilitarian philosophy
would seem to justify the punishment of an innocent person, if
other crimes could be averted by such punishment. In this respect,
therefore, utilitarianism may not be capable of fully answering the
question of who may be punished in terms that are entirely acceptable. There can be little doubt that for a government to embark
upon a practice of punishing innocent people, or even to do it in
only one instance, smacks of injustice. It may be that an explanation of the moral notions inherent in this sense of injustice must be
sought outside the utilitarian framework.
C. Retribu tivist Theory

The classical theory of retribution states that punishment possesses intrinsic worth in and of itself. In this sytem the punishment
of an individual is not justified on the basis of some ulterior purpose, such as deterrence or reformation, but rather on the theory
that punishment of the deserving is alone a good which goes far
beyond society or the individual offender. 115 Most retributivist
111
This is directly connected with the theory which would justify society's determination
of what conduct should be proscribed. See J. S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (1857).
112
See note 116 and accompanying text infra.
113
It could be argued that if the individual has not violated the law then no special
deterrent end would be served. Further, it might be contended that punishing innocent
persons would be destructive of social good unless the fact of their innocence was kept
totally secret. Finally, a utilitarian might suggest that by punishing only those persons who
have violated the law precious social interests, such as predictability of the consequences of
one's actions and general social stability. are promoted. For a discussion of some of the
social values involved. see L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW, 33-91 (1%4). Although
Fuller is discussing something quite different from the concept of responsibility, his arguments set forth many excellent positions for the utilitarians.
114
See, e.g., Greenawalt. "Uncontrollable" Actions and the Eighth Amendment: Implications of Powell v. Texas, 69 CoLUM. L. REV. 927, 939 (1969).
115
This idea has been stated as follows:
Punishment is the denial of wrong by the assertion of right. and the wrong exists in
the self. or will. of the criminal; his self is a wrongful self. and is realized in his
person and possessions; he has asserted in them his wrongful will. the incarnate
denial of right; and in denying that assertion, and annihilating. whether wholly or
partially. that incarnation by fine. or imprisonment. or even by death, we annihilate
the wrong and manifest the right; and since this. as we saw. was an end in itself. so
punishmnent is also an end in itself.
F. H. BRADLEY, ETHICAL STUDIES, THE VULGAR NOTIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY 27-28
(1927).
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theories find their support in the writings of Immanuel Kant. Kant
maintained that the only proper justification for punishing a person
is that a crime has been committed. 116 Crime in this sense means
the unlawful act of a free and responsible agent. Second, the only
manner and degree of punishment is that which is equal to the
crime. 117 These propositions must be understood together;
through them Kant set out the conditions precedent of punishment,
and the degree of punishment that is justifiable. Kant would permit
the use of punishment as a means of reformation of an individual
after these specified conditions have been met, but such a purpose
would not ab initio justify punishment. 118 It is important that
punishment be perceived not as the product of some questionable
purpose which results from a choice on the part of society, but
rather as a result of the criminal's own choice. 119 A person must,
therefore, never be treated merely as a means to some other end;
the person must be the end.
Retributivists see the criminal as acting in accordance with a
wrong maxim, which if universalized would destroy freedom. 120
By punishing, a society is pointing out the wrongfulness of the
maxim. At all times, however, the focus is on the individual's
freedom.
A pure retributive system would involve the adopting of the
maxim acted upon by the criminal and the turning of it on him.
Since he has claimed that the maxim can be universalized, he
warrants treatment in accordance with the maxim. Thus, if he has
taken the property of others, then his property should be taken,
and so forth. What we do to the criminal is simply to accept him on
his own terms. 121 To embark upon a program of inflicting useless
suffering because it is "deserved," however, would not seem to be
the most noble endeavor a civilized nation could engage in. It
should be apparent that avoiding this end was one of the major
concerns of the early reformers and the later proponents of the
juvenile justice system. Perhaps with their predominant concern
over the retributivist mandates of who must be punished, the
reformers sacrificed some important precepts as to who may be
punished when they discarded the retributionist theory.

116
I. KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, Pt. II. 195-98 (Wiltastive trans. 1887).
"' Id.
118
See E. PINCOFFS supra note JOO, at 15.
11
• Id. at 8.
120
Id. at 9.
121 Id.
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Ill. A PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE RESPONSIBILITY

A. The Role of Responsibility in the
Juvenile Court
A remarkable feature of the entire system of juvenile justice is
that, unlike the criminal law, the juvenile system goes about its
business with an avowed single-mindedness. A single principle has
charted the direction of the juvenile court; almost all disputes
which have arisen in this area have been resolved by resort to the
philosophy of doing what is in the best interests of the child.
Indeed, we might question whether this "philosophy" is even a
philosophy in traditional jurisprudential terms. It might be more
accurate to say that it is no more than "a statement of benign
motives of judges or corrections administrators, or ... a declaration of legislative intent behind the enactment of juvenile legislation." 122
It should be evident that the objectives of the juvenile court,
when viewed in terms of the classical philosophies, arise from
teleological considerations. The concern for doing that which is in
the best interest of the child can be analyzed as deriving from
certain aspects of the theories of both the utilitarian and "better
person" philosophies. Although juvenile courts have clearly departed from classical utilitarianism, as illustrated by their reluctance to acknowledge general deterrence as a justification for the
disposition of a child, 123 the concern with education, treatment,
and rehabilitation, however, can be seen as updated versions of
both the "better man" and utilitarian ideas. 124 Neither substantial
documentation nor extensive analysis is required to demonstrate
that the juvenile court in theory attempts through its dispositions to
promote the greatest "happiness" for both the child and society.
The retributivist notion of punishment as a just dessert is completely lacking from the general aims of juvenile justice. Indeed,
the entire child-saving movement can be characterized as a rejection of a jurisprudence of guilt and blameworthiness and an adoption of one ofreformation. 125 While guilt and blameworthiness may
122
Fox, Philosophy and the Principles of Punishment in the Juvenile Court, 8 FAM. L. Q.
373, 379 (I 974).
123
See note 103 and accompanying text supra.
124
The teleological origins are even more apparent when one moves from a consideration
of delinquency to an examination of the categories of "unruly" or "persons in need of
supervision." In these instances, conduct such as truancy, use of alcohol or tobacco. etc.
serves to illustrate the types of concern involved.
125
See Fox, supra note 122. at 377. The whole movement toward juvenile reform may
also be seen in the trends in the general sphere of corrections. See D. ROTHMAN, THE
DISCOVERY OF. THE ASYLUM 130-54 (1971).
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still be important concepts in any plan for rehabilitation or treatment, it is clear that in the context of juvenile justice they derive
from a teleological origin. 126 The Kantian mandate that transgressors must be punished has no support in the philosophy of juvenile
justice. 127
The abandonment of retributivist theories has had a direct correlation with the diminishing significance attached to the criminal law
concept of responsibility in juvenile law. As juvenile courts substituted the idea of treatment for punishment, they showed a progressive concern for obtaining jurisdiction over any child for whom
they felt treatment would be beneficial. While the conduct of the
child that would trigger societal intervention continued to be defined in terms of the acts proscribed by the criminal law, less and
less attention w~s paid to the mental elements of those crimes.
One of the easiest areas into which the courts could extend and
justify their jurisdiction on the basis of treatment was the insanity
defense'. If a child was sick and not responsible for her actions,
there was all the more reason for the court to intercede, since the
whole purpose for the existence of a separate juvenile justice
system was to provide assistance to children in need . 128 This was
an understandable development, particularly in light of the apparent disenchantment in some quarters with the insanity defense in
the adult criminal law . 129 If the defense of insanity were the only
aspect of the concept ofresponsibility to be discarded as a result of
the treatment philosophy, the departure from common law principles would not be too great. The juvenile court's preoccupation
with treatment objectives, however, has had a similar effect in
other areas.
While reported cases are scarce, Frederick Wiseman provided
evidence of the extent of the impact of the treatment philosophy
upon another traditional common law defense, in a 1971 cinema
verite documentary entitled Juvenile Court. The film followed the
actual operation of a juvenile court in Memphis, Tennessee
through a series of cases that came before it. In one case a child
was adjudged delinquent in spite of the judge's concession that

126
Whether such concepts as guilt and blameworthiness are really helpful aids to rehabilitation is more a psychiatric or psychological question than one of jurisprudence.
127 But see, They Think, "/ can kill because I'm /4," supra note I IO. Revenge is also
something that may have to be taken into account. See H.M. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal
Law, 23 L. & CoNTEMP. PROB. 401 (1958). It should be noted that there has been a good deal
of disenchantment with this particular retributive idea throughout the entire system of
criminal law. See, e.g., J. MITFORD, KIND AND USUAL PUNISHMENT (1971).
128
State ex rel. H. C., 106 N.J. Super. 583,256 A.2d 322. (Juv. and Dom. Rel. Ct., Morris
County 1969).
129
See, e.g., Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"-Why not?, 72 YALE L.
J. 853 (1963).
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self-defense was probably established. 130 While recognizing that
self-defense was involved, the judge concluded that other factors
indicated that the youth needed help. 131 As a result, a child, whose
actions would probably have been justifiable in terms of the criminal law, was committed to the youth authorities of Tennessee as a
delinquent.
A similar line of reasoning to support a child's commitment for
treatment could easily be constructed to justify the abolition of
other defenses, such as ignorance or mistake. In terms of the
juvenile court philosophy, the court might envision that a child
needs treatment to make him aware of his misapprehension of
certain facts, even though such misapprehension would ordinarily
exculpate the child from criminal liability. Indeed, in one such case
mens rea, or the intent to commit the act itself, was considered
irrelevant. 132
Thus, while juvenile justice has adopted an objective which
derives from utilitarian considerations, in some instances there has
been a marked departure from the traditional utilitarian limitations
embodied in the concept of responsibility which are placed upon
this objective. Both classical and modern utilitarians have seen
mens rea as a device through which other values that are vitally
important to society are respected. These include, among other
things, the predictability of the consequences of one's actions,
social stability, and, perhaps most importantly, principles of freedom and liberty. Within the utilitarian framework, a primary endeavor is to prevent the occurrence of criminal acts. It has been
recognized that this objective can succeed only in cases in which
the individual understands what he is doing and can feel the significance of the sanction imposed upon violators. 133 It is unlikely,
therefore, that society could deter an individual who either did not
intend to do the act or who did not appreciate the wrongfulness of
the act. In addition, it does little good for individuals in positions
similar to that of the actor to see the actor punished for something
he did not intend to do. Official intervention under these circumstances could lead to a perception of the entire system as
dependent on the capriciousness of fate. If it is impossible for a
person to avoid the sanction, the integrity of the legal system

130
The facts of the case were not clearly presented in the film, but apparently the child
had used the family gun to defend himself against an aggressor who entered his family's
home.
131
These other factors were not specified in the film, although the judge did display some
displeasure with the fact that the parents had left the gun in a place accessible to the youth.
132
See notes 64-65 and accompanying text supra.
134
See A. GoLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 12-15 (1967).
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suffers and may lead inevitably to a total denial of individual
freedom.
In utilitarian terms, therefore, the doctrine of mens rea can be
seen as the vehicle through which other values are respected.
However, in a utilitarian philosophy freedom may simply be one
value to be considered along with many others. Thus, freedom
could become a relativistic idea that could be compromised when
balanced against other values. For example, compromise has occurred in the criminal law where liability is strict or absolute. Here
the relatively slight penalty, even for an unintentional violation
such as a minor traffic offense, is offset by the danger from the
conduct and injury that could result to society. It must be recognized that a valuable ideal has been sacrificed to the public good. 134
While strict liability offenses may not present any great danger to
the general ideal of freedom, it is at this point that one also encounters the dilemma of punishing the innocent to achieve some other
good, such as general deterrence. 135
By contrast, the retributivist places the same limitations upon
governmental activity but in a way that is independent of social
purposes. The only condition upon which a theory of retribution
would permit coercive societal intervention is that the individual
had been convicted of a crime that was the product of his will. 136 In
a retributivist view, regardless of the beneficial consequences
which could be achieved, only after a conviction is society justified
in interfering with an individual's liberty or property. To do otherwise is to deny the values of freedom and humanity 137 and to treat
an individual merely as a means and not as an end. 138
When the early juvenile justice theorists rejected the retributivist
philosophy as an aim of the juvenile court, it appears that they and
those that have followed them also felt compelled to reject the
limitations which that philosophy places upon governmental intervention.139 However, they failed to realize that retribution could be
denied as an aim 9f the juvenile court while still accepting the
limitations articulated therein. 140 As in the utilitarian philosophy,
134

See H.L.A. HART, supra note 25, at 4-10.
See note 114 and accompanying text supra.
136
See E. PINCOFFS, supra note 100, at 81-94. The retributivist philosophy would also
permit societal intervention for the mentally ill for two reasons. First, the individual is not a
free rational being and therefore is not morally responsible. Secondly, generally the requirement that the individual is dangerous to himself or others must be demonstrated. The
combination of these two factors would justify the intervention.
137
See C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment. 6 RES JuorcATAE 224
(1953).
138
/. Kant, supra note 116, at 195-98.
139
See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
140
That is, as a principle of distribution. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 25. Of course, it
might be suggested that theorists knew precisely what they were doing and were thereby
able to expand governmental authority into previously circumscribed areas.
1 35
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the concept of freedom which prohibits overzealous governmental
intervention is at the heart of the retributivist limitation. The effect,
therefore, of a complete rejection of retribution has been a significant dilution of the principle of freedom.
In our society freedom has always been and is today highly
valued. 141 Yet, acknowledgement of this fact does not require an
abandonment of teleological objectives but rather recognition that
both philosophies represent important values. A teleological approach demands that any governmental intervention be designed to
serve useful purposes while the principles of retribution protect an
individual's freedom. Jointly, therefore, these two philosophies
provide rules of exclusion which determine whether governmental
action is justifiable. Accordingly, intervention should be confined
to those instances in which both theories argue that it is justified. In
other words, if we view the justifications offered by both
philosophies as intersecting circles, intervention should be justified
only in cases which come within the area that is mutually shared.
Governmental action is therefore justifiable only against those
persons who have committed an offense and for whom such action
would serve a useful purpose.
While it is not always easy to ascertain the objectives sought by
the adult criminal process, because of other conflicting values, 142
the problem need not be as difficult in the juvenile court, which has
already recognized a primary social purpose limitation. The Uniform Juvenile Court Act defines a delinquent child as one "who
has committed a delinquent act and is in need of treatment or
rehabilitation." 143 All that would be necessary, therefore, to outline the objectives of the juvenile justice system is the additional
recognition of the standard derived from principles of freedom and
liberty, and established by the concept of responsibility. These are
not only part of a metaphysical philosophy but are the fundamental
underpinnings of our entire society.
141

It has been pointed out that:
In modern times. the doctrine of inviolable rights and fundamental liberties of the
individual and social groups - as freedom of religion. liberty of thought, respect
for human dignity aside from every racial discrimination. etc. - has clearly
confirmed the view that law is limited by principles of moral order. Indeed. such
principles are often regarded as the very foundation of legal order. and therefore
represent the basic criteria of its interpretation.
S. Cotta D .. Law Between Ethics and Politics, in THE LIMITS OF LAW, Nomos XV 90
(1974).
142 A simple instance of conflict might exist. for example, between the theories of special
and general deterrence. It is easy to imagine a situation where in order to serve the ends of
general deterrence ideas of special deterrence are abandoned. In addition, it is difficult to
gauge just how prominent ideas such as revenge are in the criminal law. These circumstances might, therefore. complicate the use of this model for adults.
143
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM
JUVENILE COURT ACT § 2(3) (1968).
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The issue which must now be faced is whether there are significant differences between children and adults; and if so, whether
this leads to the conclusion that the doctrine of mens rea is inappropriate in juvenile proceedings.

B. Punishment v. Treatment
A problem which might be encountered when urging that the
juvenile court recognize the concept of responsibility arises from
the suggestion that the concept of responsibility in both utilitarian
and retributive philosophies derives from a rationale of punishment. The juvenile court is presumably not concerned with
punishment but rather with assistance and treatment. 144 The question, therefore, is whether a treatment philosophy suggests that
mens rea should be eliminated. It would be tempting to simply say
that the juvenile justice system is in fact punishing children under
the guise of treatment. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 145 as well as some of the
reported decisions 146 provide ample evidence of the punitive nature of many juvenile institutions. This evidence, however forceful, does not completely meet the objection to using the concept of
responsibility. By contrasting the processes of the adult criminal
law with those of the juvenile justice system, however, the parallel
between the adult's punishment and the juvenile's treatment can be
seen.
To begin with, the behavior which results in a finding of delinquency is defined in terms of the criminal code. 147 The apprehension through which a juvenile is called to the system's attention is
accomplished almost exclusively by the police. 148 The determination of whether the child engaged in the proscribed activity is
conducted before a judicial tribunal, and proof of identification of
the youth who committed the act must be made beyond a reasonable doubt. 149 Moreover, the dispositional alternatives available to
the juvenile court include_ probation and commitment to juvenile
144
The National Council of Juve.nile Judges expressed the basic premise of juvenile court
jurisdiction. "Children are different from adults and deserve not only due process protection
but also the benefit of individualized dispositions based on the needs of the child .... "
Resolution of the National Council of Juvenile Judges, (July 11, 1974), reprinted in Fox,
Philosophy and the Principles of Punishment in the Jul'enile Court, 8 FAM. L.Q. 373 (1974).
See also Mack, supra note 38.

145

PRESIDENT"S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JusTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 141-54 (1967).
146
See, e.g., Lollis v. New York State Dep't of Social Servs., 322 F.Supp. 473 (S.D.N. Y.
1970).
147
Such a provision is found in almost every juvenile court act. See note 42 supra.
148
See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 11-14 (1967).
149
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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institutions, which are frequently highly penal. 150 Most of the
"treatment" personnel see themselves as operating within a correctional system. 151 In addition, a stigma attaches to a delinquent
in a manner similar to an adult criminal. 152
In discussing the treatment-punishment dichotomy, it must be
recognized that a semaritic digression has been encountered. If
what one has in mind as punishment involves the rack and the
wheel, then, of course, the treatment provided by the juvenile
court cannot be considered punishment. Indeed, by that test there
is very little punishment being meted out even in maximum security adult institutions. If, however, punishment is viewed as an
interference with an individual's liberty, through official coercion,
predicated upon an infraction of the criminal code, then the
juvenile court is clearly engaged in the business of punishment.
H.L.A. Hart has frequently pointed out that by defining punishment too narrowly, problems that warrant discussion are often
erroneously obscured. 153 This is precisely what has resulted from
the juvenile court's polarization of treatment and punishment.
Even if the juvenile court only made dispositions for psychiatric
or psychological care in appropriate cases, there would still be
grounds for objection to the sole use of the treatment philosophy.
The most forceful reason to oppose such dispositon becomes clear
when it is remembered that a system for the civil commitment of
the mentally ill is already in existence. Under the laws providing
for civil commitment, the standards that authorize intervention are
quite different from those employed by the juvenile court. 154 It is
also interesting to note that there is considerable reason to believe
that most delinquent children are not in need of psychiatric or
psychological care. 155 More pragmatically, the basis used in
150
See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 141-54 (1967).
151
Sheridan, Juveniles Who Commit Non-Criminal Acts: Why Treat in a Correctional
System?, 31 FED. PRoe. 26 (1967). It is interesting that arguments are now being made to
exclude from the juvenile court jurisdiction children who have not committed criminal acts
because they do not deserve punishment. Id.
152
Sheridan has noted the magnitude and consequences of this stigma:
Despite all measures. statutory or otherwise. to protect from stigma the youngster
who is a product of the correctional system. it is well known that such stigma exists
to almost as great a degree as in the adult field. It may act as a bar to employment or
enlistment in the armed services. It may even continue to be a handicap for years.
There is. for example. the case of the family whose application for public housing
was tu med down partly on the basis that the husband committed minor offenses as
a juvenile.
Id. at 28.
153
H.L.A. HART, supra note 25, at 6.
154
See Kent v. United States, 130 U.S.App. D.C. 343, 401 F.2d 408 (1%8), especially
note 4 in Judge Burger's dissent.
155
For an excellent discussion of the appropriateness of mental health care for delinquents, see Miller & Kennedy. Adolescent Delinquency and the Myth of Hospital Treatment. 12 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 38 (1966).
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juvenile court for determining whether a child is in need of treatment should be observed. Section 29 of the Uniform Juvenile Court
Act provides, "In the absence of evidence to the contrary, evidence of the commission of acts which constitute a felony is sufficient to sustain a finding that the child is in need of treatment or
rehabilitation.'' 156
By focusing exclusively on the potential of a treatment disposition, the juvenile justice system has created more problems than it
has resolved, for it has never confronted the fundamental question
of responsibility. Hence, the question of whom the system may
legitimately operate against is never directly faced.
C. A Child's Capacity for Judgment

The doctrine of mens rea is predicated on a view of the individual
as a free, moral agent, capable of rational activity. Therefore, while
the purpose of the requirement of mens rea appears to have great
force when applied to adults, when attention is directed toward
children it could be argued its impact is dissipated.
During the early stages of childhood it is clear that a child is not
responsible for her actions. Only as a child grows does she begin to
develop a sense of right and wrong and acquire the ability to
distinguish between them. The best example to portray this growth
is probably the development of property concepts and the idea of
stealing.· In the early stages, perhaps all young children are potential thieves. 157 Gradually, however, education and an awareness of
social demands cause a shift toward the development of honesty . 158 At precisely what point a child is capable of distinguishing
between right and wrong and is able to act on the basis of the
distinction is not something that is susceptible to general statement

156

UNIFORM Jl/VENILE COURT ACT, supra note 2, § 20(b).
As Anna Freud has pointed out:
The ideas of "mine" and "not mine" which are indispensable concepts for the
establishment of adult "honesty," develop very gradually. keeping step with the
infant's gradual progress toward achievement of individual status. They apply first,
probably, to the child's own body, next to the parents, then to the transitional
objects, all of which are cathected both narcissistically and with object love.
Significantly enough, as soon as the concept of "mine" emerges in the child's
mind, he begins to guard his possessions fiercely andjealously against any interference. The notion of "being deprived of' or "stolen from" is understood by him
long before the opposite one, that other people's property has to be respected.
Before the latter becomes meaningful, the child has to extend and intensify his
relationships to his fellow beings and to learn empathy with their attachment to
their property. Whatever the rate of progress in this respect, the concepts of
"mine" and "yours" as such have little influence over the young child's.behavior,
since they conflict witli very powerful desires for appropriation.
A. FREUD, NORMALITY AND PATHOLOGY IN CHILDHOOD I 17-18 (1965).
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Id. ai 118.
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by either psychology, psychiatry, or law. The common law recognized this problem and incorporated a large degree of flexibility
into the infancy defense. Through various presumptions the immature child was protected, and a child could be held responsible only
after it was established that she could distinguish between right and
wrong.159
The infancy defense, however, has not been applied in juvenile
court proceedings, 160 and few juvenile courts specify the lower age
limits of the court's jurisdiction. 161 Thus, in theory, from the day a
child is born, in most jurisdictions, she could be proceeded against
as a delinquent. There are, however, no reported cases involving
an attempt to charge delinquency against a child under the common
law immunity age of seven. 162 Good sense seems to have prevailed, at least so far.
At the other end of the spectrum, every state sets a maximum
age for the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. The most frequent
maximum age is eighteen. 163 The effect of juvenile court legislation
with no minimum age and a high maximum age, such as eighteen, is
to eliminate the infancy defense for all within the group, while at
the same time creating an almost conclusive presumption of incompetence. Before the law, all members of this class are in the
same position. 164 The teachings of the behavioral sciences, as well
as common sense, indicate that there is a considerable difference in
the mental and emotional makeup of an infant and a fifteen-,
sixteen-, or seventeen-year-old youth. The objection that children
do not possess the requisite moral judgment and should be treated
differently from adults ignores the point that most of the youths
over whom the juvenile court exercises its jurisdiction probably do
have the ability to distinguish between right and wrong and to
conform their conduct accordingly. Studies on the subject of the
moral judgment of children, 165 indicate that the concept of responsibility plays an important role not only in the law, but in psychology as well. 166 Consequently, there may be little reason to distinguish between an adult and a child on the basis of the capability of
either to make responsible judgments. In cases where the capabil-
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ity is lacking, traditional principles for determining responsibility
found in the common law appear to be in accord with the behavioral sciences. The values protected by the concept of responsibility should not be surrendered, therefore, on the basis of a
distinction that may not exist in reality or for which adequate
account has already been taken.
D. The Liberty of Children

The central issue thus becomes whether the principles of freedom and liberty that are at the core of the doctrine of mens rea
should be applicable to children as well as adults, vis-a-vis state
intervention because of their conduct. The United States Supreme
Court recognized this argument in the Gault case, in which Justice
Fortas wrote:
... a child, unlike an adult, has a right 'not to liberty but to
custody.' He can be made to attorn to his parents, to go to
school, etc. If his parents default in effectively performing
their custodial functions - that is, if the child is 'delinquent'
- the state may intervene. In doing so, it does not deprive the
child of any rights, because he has none. It merely provides the
'custody' to which the child is entitled. 167

There can be little doubt that society has often treated children
as chattels of the family unit, with no separate status. 168 In addition, society has frequently been highly solicitous of the welfare of
children. Legislatures have enacted child labor, compulsory school
attendance, and vaccination laws to look after the interests of
children. There has also been, however, a distinct recognition that
children have fundamental rights. The United States Supreme
Court has held that several constitutional rights must be afforded
children. 169 Many of these rights, however, could be viewed as
simply the mechanical application of formality to proceedings in
order to insure the trustworthiness of the outcome. When requiring
that such safeguards as notice of the proceedings, confrontation
and cross-examination of witnesses, or the right to counsel be
provided, 110 the freedom of children is not necessarily recognized.
These safeguards may be used only because they offer one of the
best methods to obtain all the facts in any given dispute, in an
orderly fashion, and in a way which assures full appreciation of
In re Gault, 387 U.S. I. 17 (1967).
See R. BREMUER, I CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA 27-49 (1970).
169 For a brief summary of these rights, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 243-44
(1972) (Douglas. J., dissenting).
170 All of these rights were found to be applicable to juveniles in In re Gault, 387 U.S. I
(1967).
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their significance. To a lesser extent, the same is true with regard
to affording an individual a privilege against self-incrimination . 171
Certain police practices, for example, might make a confession
obtained under circumstances of custodial interrogation unreliable . 172 By requiring observation of the privilege against selfincrimination, however, there also appears to be a recognition that
the individual is a person whose liberty is important; and that if the
government wishes to deprive the person of his liberty, it should be
able to do so only upon the basis of competent evidence and
without the coerced assistance of the accused. A similar respect for
the fundamental value ofliberty can be seen in the requirement that
the government establish its case by proof which is beyond a
reasonable doubt. 173 Such a standard impresses upon the trier of
fact that a decision of grave consequence is being made. The state
should be entitled to interfere with a person's freedom only if there
is no reasonable doubt on the issue of whether the person committed the offense. The prohibition against being twice put in
jeopardy 1 74 al so displays a concern for the freedom of children by
pointing to the limits within which government intervention is
justified. A clear example which shows that children share in the
value of freedom that is cherished by our society is the protection
afforded them by the first amendment guarantee of free speech. 1 75
Finally, the right of a minor child to obtain an abortion over
parental objection 1 76 demonstrates that a child is a free person
under the Constitution.
The Supreme Court through its. holdings has recognized that
children are entitled to be treated as individuals who enjoy the
rights of liberty. It is especially necessary to respect this value
when the state is attempting to deprive a child of his freedom on the
basis of a criminal law violation. The Court has stated that
"[n]either man nor child can be allowed to stand condemned by
methods which flout constitutional requirements of due process of
law." 177 By requiring that procedural rights be afforded children,
the Supreme Court has recognized that the ideas of freedom and
liberty from which these constitutional limitations derive also
apply to children.
It is, to a certain extent, unfortunate that such forceful action by
the Supreme Court was necessary to compel an awakening to the
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fact that children share in society's fundamental ideals. It is particularly ironic that the freedom of children has recently come into
question under criminal law in the context that it has. It was only
through "humanitarian" efforts of juvenile court legislation that
children were forced to surrender their right to liberty, a right that
had been recognized throughout the course of the common law.
The freedom of children became an issue solely as a result of the
early reformers and the theorists of the juvenile court and even
then not because of any well-reasoned philosophical analysis but,
more likely, simply because of a misapprehension of the role of the
retributive theories of punishment.
The Supreme Court has recently remarked concerning the double jeopardy requirement that "[u]nder our decisions we can find
no persuasive distinction ... between the proceeding conducted in
[a delinquency action] and a criminal prosecution, each of which is
designed 'to vindicate [the] very vital interest in enforcement of
common law.' " 1 78 It has been realized, therefore, that the same
interests are involved in both a delinquency adjudication and a
criminal prosecution. What is needed now in the juvenile justice
system is an appreciation of the role that the concept ofresponsibility has played in the criminal law.
Much of the discussion in this article has focused on the realities
of juvenile justice. Even in the most idealized system of justice,
however, the concept of responsibility has a place. Freedom,
which is the foundation of the doctrine of mens rea, is an ideal that
must stand with all others in our society and be shared in by all. To
ignore the wisdom of generations which is contained in the jurisprudence of the criminal law is, therefore, also to ignore the highest
values of our society.

IV. CONCLUSION

The early juvenile justice reformers were extremely concerned
about the imprisonment and punishment of children by the criminal
courts of their time. Such punishment of children was frequently
viewed as cruel and barbaric, and almost always seen as futile.
These reformers, therefore, agitated and lobbied to remove children from the prisons and other penal institutions in which they
were found. They were not content, however, with simply altering
the dispositional alternatives available for children. The reformers

178

Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519,531 (1975).

WINTER

1977)

Responsibility in Juvenile Delinquency

219

succeeded in establishing an entirely separate juvenile justice system, in which the principles of the criminal law were deemed to be
irrelevant because only guidance and assistance were to be provided .
. In the 150 years that have elapsed since the beginning of the
juvenile justice reform movement, adult penology has adopted
many of the treatment and rehabilitative goals that were once the
hallmark of the juvenile system. In addition, many of the failings
and abuses of juvenile justice have come to light and now demand
correction. Indeed, it might even be suggested that the juvenile
court experiment has created more problems than it has solved and
consequently should be abandoned.
Nevertheless, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and the Administration of Justice, while being mindful of the difficulties involved, has recommended that the juvenile court should
continue to exist as a separate agency . 179 Perhaps it is not yet time
to abandon the. special intake procedures or the other benefits
available to children in thejuvenile court. Perhaps even by virtue
of its separate status the juvenile court is made constantly aware of
its primary objective to aid children whenever possible. It is undoubtedly the time, however, to attempt to put the house in order.
The United States Supreme Court has begun to reshape the
juvenile court through its holdings that require procedural regularity in an attempt to guard against unjustifiable intervention in the
lives of children by government. If there is a concern over the
expansive and abusive powers of the state, however, it is not
necessary to rediscover the wheel. The principles of the criminal
law, particularly those embodied in the doctrine of mens rea and
actus reus, were applied in the common law specifically as limitations on governmental activity. What is needed now is a recognition that whether one adopts a utilitarian or a retributivist theory of
law, the concept of responsibility has an important role to play.
Through it the ideal of freedom upon which our society is founded
is not only observed but protected. By recognizing that the concept
of responsibility has an important function in a delinquency proceeding, the juvenile court will be adhering not only to an abstract
metaphysical theory but to the goal to which our entire system of
justice is dedicated.

179
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JusTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 9 (1967).

